VMware vCenter: authentication bypass CVE-2026-123890 exploited since September, Broadcom ships fixes

Top-Secured cyber watch: independent analysis based on the sources listed below. Top-Secured is not affiliated with the companies mentioned and will never ask you for your bank details or passwords.

Broadcom fixed CVE-2026-123890 on 19 November, an authentication bypass rated 9.8 in the directory service of vCenter Server, with no workaround. According to Google Threat Intelligence and Mandiant, a suspected Chinese espionage group had already been exploiting it since early September to take full control of vCenter and the virtual machines behind it.

What happened

On 19 November 2026, Broadcom published advisory VMSA-2026-0009, rated critical. Its main flaw, CVE-2026-123890 (CVSS 9.8), lies in the VMware Directory Service (vmdird) of vCenter Server: an attacker who can reach vCenter over the network can bypass authentication. Broadcom lists no workaround. The same advisory fixes four other flaws in SDDC Manager and VMware Tools for Windows. Broadcom does not mention exploitation, but Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant report that a suspected China-linked espionage actor, which they track as ARMORY CASTLE (formerly UNC5221), was already using the flaw in early September.

How the attackers operated

According to Mandiant, the intrusion started with a zero-day in a BeyondTrust Remote Support appliance, then moved to internal Linux appliances without EDR. From there, a tool named BONESAW abused the flaw through the vmdird RPC service on TCP port 2012, copied the directory database, extracted the SAML signing key and created a hidden SSO administrator. With that key, the attackers forged sessions for any user, bypassing MFA, enabled SSH on vCenter, then reached the ESXi hosts and pulled Active Directory databases out of guest virtual machines.

What to do now

  1. Patch vCenter: 8.0 U3m for 8.0, 9.0.2.0200 for 9.0.x, 9.1.1.0200 for 9.1.x, 5.2.5 for VCF 5.x. vCenter 7.0 is affected and only covered through extended support: plan the upgrade.
  2. Restrict access to ports 2012, 389/636, 443, 5480 and 22 of vCenter to administration workstations only.
  3. Look for unknown SSO administrators, local accounts named sps-*@vsphere.local and calls to PUT /rest/appliance/access/ssh in the logs.
  4. If anything is suspicious, Mandiant advises rotating the SAML signing certificate and resetting administrator@vsphere.local and vpxuser; on ESXi, check root’s authorized_keys.

Our take

vCenter holds the keys to every virtual server of a company, yet it is often left reachable from the whole internal network. Here the attackers never touched it from the internet: they came from another, poorly monitored appliance. Isolating the management plane matters as much as patching it.

Sources

How we choose, verify and write our analyses →

Is your own server exposed? Run a free check — public information only, no intrusion:

Check a server Check a website

Worried your servers are exposed? Our team audits, patches and monitors Linux and cloud infrastructure 24/7.

Talk to an expert Our managed server services →