
Top-Secured cyber watch: independent analysis based on the official statement of Optimizely and on the press. Top-Secured is not affiliated with this company and will never ask you for your bank details or passwords.
Optimizely says an attacker exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects on 16 November. The code, served from Optimizely’s own CDN, stole card details and swapped crypto wallet addresses on the sites that load it.
What happened
On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of websites that use Optimizely Web, the A/B testing service that sites load as a script from Optimizely’s CDN. In a notice on its status page, Optimizely says an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious code to some customer projects. The company says it has fixed the flaw, removed the injected code, secured the affected user accounts and added safeguards to stop unauthorised code from being delivered. It has not said how many customers were affected.
How the attack worked
According to Report URI, the security company that analysed the campaign, the attacker left the rest of the snippet untouched and wrote its loader into the Project JavaScript field, the custom code each customer can run on every page. The file therefore still came from Optimizely’s trusted domain, including for sites that serve the snippet from their own domain. The first injection Report URI saw dates from 04:21 UTC; the last infected files were cleaned at 23:11 UTC. It found the code in 188 of the 1,611 snippets it fetched, belonging to 178 organisations, mostly in banking and finance, and believes the real number is higher. The code swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, captured card details typed into forms, sent readable cookies and page screenshots to the attacker’s server, and tried to load exploit kits on outdated iPhones. Report URI puts the crypto received by the attacker at about $7,000; how many cards were stolen is unknown.
What to do now
- If you use Optimizely Web, review Project JavaScript and each experiment’s custom code for the domain
1688360.cc,atob(calls or scripts you do not recognise, and check the snippet actually served:curl -s https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/PROJECT_ID.js | grep -cE '1688360|_k7|atob', then inspect any hit by hand. - Audit the accounts, API tokens and integrations with write access to your projects, delete those no longer used and rotate the others.
- If your own pages collect card numbers (rather than a payment provider’s iframe), treat cards entered on 16 November as possibly exposed: tell your payment provider and assess with your DPO whether a GDPR notification is due.
- Search your logs and CSP reports for requests to
1688360.cc, and set session cookies toHttpOnlyso that scripts cannot read them. - Deploy a Content-Security-Policy that limits
connect-srcto your own domains and your payment provider, avoids'unsafe-eval'and sends violation reports.
Our take
A marketing script loaded from a third party runs with the same rights as your own code, on every page, checkout and login included. Keep sensitive pages free of non-essential scripts and use CSP to decide where data may go: a trusted vendor can be compromised overnight.
Sources
- Optimizely Status — Web Experimentation Security Incident
- Report URI — World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely
- Numerama — Le piratage de l’outil de test web Optimizely a contaminé près de 180 sites
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