
Top-Secured cyber watch: independent analysis based on the official statement of Uber and on the press. Top-Secured is not affiliated with this company and will never ask you for your bank details or passwords.
Uber has told several US state regulators that an attacker used a service provider’s stolen credentials to access driver’s licence images and data. The data sat in cloud storage set up for that provider, and no alert fired because the credentials were valid.
What happened
Uber is notifying people that driver’s licence data it held was accessed by an unauthorised party through one of its service providers. In letters filed with several US state attorneys general, including Iowa and California, the company explains that on 9 October 2026 a service provider told it that an attacker had compromised the provider’s internal credentials and used them to reach Uber’s account with that provider. On 13 October, Uber’s investigation found that the credentials had been used on 7 October to access Uber data linked to the provider. Uber cut its data connections with the provider and deleted or rotated the associated credentials; the provider says it revoked the compromised ones. Letters to individuals started on 10 November, with free credit monitoring.
What data, how the attacker got in
The data included images of driver’s licences and text extracted from them: name, address, date of birth and licence number. It sat in a cloud storage environment that Uber had created specifically for the provider’s work, covered by its own cloud security team and with alerting enabled. Because the attacker used valid credentials and the data flows already in place, no alert fired, Uber says. The credentials gave no access to other Uber systems, and the investigation is ongoing. Uber does not name the provider. Its letter to Iowa mentions about 2,999 residents of that state. According to TechCrunch, which cites a filing with Oregon’s attorney general, 149,346 people are being notified in total, and they are drivers; the letters we read give no overall figure.
What to do now
- List every bucket or share opened for a provider and who can read it:
aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket NAME,aws iam list-access-keys --user-name NAME, or the equivalent on Azure and Google Cloud. - Give each provider its own credentials, read-only on the narrow prefix it needs, short-lived (IAM role, SAS token with an expiry date) and, where possible, limited to its IP addresses.
- Alert on behaviour, not only on failed logins: enable data-access logs (CloudTrail data events, S3 access logs) and watch for unusual download volumes or new source addresses.
- Delete what the provider no longer needs: a lifecycle rule that purges documents once processed shrinks what can be stolen.
- Put a notification deadline in the contract and rehearse cutting a provider’s access within minutes.
Our take
The attacker took the exact path built for the provider, with the right keys, and no control flagged it. For any data shared with a third party, assume its credentials will be stolen one day, and limit what they can read, for how long and from where.
Sources
- Iowa Attorney General — Uber Technologies, Inc. notification of security incident
- California Attorney General — Data breach notice: Uber Technologies, Inc.
- TechCrunch — Uber confirms hackers stole drivers’ license information in data breach
- The Record — Uber says nearly 150,000 impacted by third-party breach
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